CVE-2021-46931

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/mlx5e: Wrap the tx reporter dump callback to extract the sq

Function mlx5e_tx_reporter_dump_sq() casts its void * argument to struct mlx5e_txqsq *, but in TX-timeout-recovery flow the argument is actually of type struct mlx5e_tx_timeout_ctx *.

mlx5_core 0000:08:00.1 enp8s0f1: TX timeout detected mlx5_core 0000:08:00.1 enp8s0f1: TX timeout on queue: 1, SQ: 0x11ec, CQ: 0x146d, SQ Cons: 0x0 SQ Prod: 0x1, usecs since last trans: 21565000 BUG: stack guard page was hit at 0000000093f1a2de (stack is 00000000b66ea0dc..000000004d932dae) kernel stack overflow (page fault): 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 5 PID: 95 Comm: kworker/u20:1 Tainted: G W OE 5.13.0_mlnx #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Workqueue: mlx5e mlx5e_tx_timeout_work [mlx5_core] RIP: 0010:mlx5e_tx_reporter_dump_sq+0xd3/0x180 [mlx5_core] Call Trace: mlx5e_tx_reporter_dump+0x43/0x1c0 [mlx5_core] devlink_health_do_dump.part.91+0x71/0xd0 devlink_health_report+0x157/0x1b0 mlx5e_reporter_tx_timeout+0xb9/0xf0 [mlx5_core] ? mlx5e_tx_reporter_err_cqe_recover+0x1d0/0x1d0 [mlx5_core] ? mlx5e_health_queue_dump+0xd0/0xd0 [mlx5_core] ? update_load_avg+0x19b/0x550 ? set_next_entity+0x72/0x80 ? pick_next_task_fair+0x227/0x340 ? finish_task_switch+0xa2/0x280 mlx5e_tx_timeout_work+0x83/0xb0 [mlx5_core] process_one_work+0x1de/0x3a0 worker_thread+0x2d/0x3c0 ? process_one_work+0x3a0/0x3a0 kthread+0x115/0x130 ? kthread_park+0x90/0x90 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 –[ end trace 51ccabea504edaff ]— RIP: 0010:mlx5e_tx_reporter_dump_sq+0xd3/0x180 PKRU: 55555554 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception Kernel Offset: disabled end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

To fix this bug add a wrapper for mlx5e_tx_reporter_dump_sq() which extracts the sq from struct mlx5e_tx_timeout_ctx and set it as the TX-timeout-recovery flow dump callback.

Weakness

The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.

Affected Software

Potential Mitigations

• Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

• For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.

• Be wary that a language’s interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.

• Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

• Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.

• Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

• D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

• Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application’s memory:

• Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program’s executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

• Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as “rebasing” (for Windows) and “prelinking” (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

• For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

• Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

• For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07f13d58a8ecc3baf9a488588fb38c5cb0db484f
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/73665165b64a8f3c5b3534009a69be55bb744f05
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/918fc3855a6507a200e9cf22c20be852c0982687
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07f13d58a8ecc3baf9a488588fb38c5cb0db484f
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/73665165b64a8f3c5b3534009a69be55bb744f05
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/918fc3855a6507a200e9cf22c20be852c0982687