CVE Vulnerabilities

CVE-2022-2003

Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information

Published: Aug 31, 2022 | Modified: Sep 06, 2022
CVSS 3.x
9.1
CRITICAL
Source:
NVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
CVSS 2.x
RedHat/V2
RedHat/V3
Ubuntu

AutomationDirect DirectLOGIC is vulnerable to a specifically crafted serial message to the CPU serial port that will cause the PLC to respond with the PLC password in cleartext. This could allow an attacker to access and make unauthorized changes. This issue affects: AutomationDirect DirectLOGIC D0-06 series CPUs D0-06DD1 versions prior to 2.72; D0-06DD2 versions prior to 2.72; D0-06DR versions prior to 2.72; D0-06DA versions prior to 2.72; D0-06AR versions prior to 2.72; D0-06AA versions prior to 2.72; D0-06DD1-D versions prior to 2.72; D0-06DD2-D versions prior to 2.72; D0-06DR-D versions prior to 2.72;

Weakness

The product transmits sensitive or security-critical data in cleartext in a communication channel that can be sniffed by unauthorized actors.

Affected Software

Name Vendor Start Version End Version
D0-06dd1_firmware Automationdirect * *

Extended Description

Many communication channels can be “sniffed” (monitored) by adversaries during data transmission. For example, in networking, packets can traverse many intermediary nodes from the source to the destination, whether across the internet, an internal network, the cloud, etc. Some actors might have privileged access to a network interface or any link along the channel, such as a router, but they might not be authorized to collect the underlying data. As a result, network traffic could be sniffed by adversaries, spilling security-critical data. Applicable communication channels are not limited to software products. Applicable channels include hardware-specific technologies such as internal hardware networks and external debug channels, supporting remote JTAG debugging. When mitigations are not applied to combat adversaries within the product’s threat model, this weakness significantly lowers the difficulty of exploitation by such adversaries. When full communications are recorded or logged, such as with a packet dump, an adversary could attempt to obtain the dump long after the transmission has occurred and try to “sniff” the cleartext from the recorded communications in the dump itself.

Potential Mitigations

References