An Improper Access Control vulnerability in the Juniper Networks Paragon Active Assurance Control Center allows an unauthenticated attacker to leverage a crafted URL to generate PDF reports, potentially containing sensitive configuration information. A feature was introduced in version 3.1 of the Paragon Active Assurance Control Center which allows users to selective share account data using a unique identifier. Knowing the proper format of the URL and the identifier of an existing object in an application it is possible to get access to that object without being logged in, even if the object is not shared, resulting in the opportunity for malicious exfiltration of user data. Note that the Paragon Active Assurance Control Center SaaS offering is not affected by this issue. This issue affects Juniper Networks Paragon Active Assurance version 3.1.0.
The system’s authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user’s data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Paragon_active_assurance_control_center | Juniper | 3.1.0 (including) | 3.1.0 (including) |
Retrieval of a user record occurs in the system based on some key value that is under user control. The key would typically identify a user-related record stored in the system and would be used to lookup that record for presentation to the user. It is likely that an attacker would have to be an authenticated user in the system. However, the authorization process would not properly check the data access operation to ensure that the authenticated user performing the operation has sufficient entitlements to perform the requested data access, hence bypassing any other authorization checks present in the system. For example, attackers can look at places where user specific data is retrieved (e.g. search screens) and determine whether the key for the item being looked up is controllable externally. The key may be a hidden field in the HTML form field, might be passed as a URL parameter or as an unencrypted cookie variable, then in each of these cases it will be possible to tamper with the key value. One manifestation of this weakness is when a system uses sequential or otherwise easily-guessable session IDs that would allow one user to easily switch to another user’s session and read/modify their data.