Puma is a simple, fast, multi-threaded, parallel HTTP 1.1 server for Ruby/Rack applications. When using Puma behind a proxy that does not properly validate that the incoming HTTP request matches the RFC7230 standard, Puma and the frontend proxy may disagree on where a request starts and ends. This would allow requests to be smuggled via the front-end proxy to Puma. The vulnerability has been fixed in 5.6.4 and 4.3.12. Users are advised to upgrade as soon as possible. Workaround: when deploying a proxy in front of Puma, turning on any and all functionality to make sure that the request matches the RFC7230 standard.
The product acts as an intermediary HTTP agent (such as a proxy or firewall) in the data flow between two entities such as a client and server, but it does not interpret malformed HTTP requests or responses in ways that are consistent with how the messages will be processed by those entities that are at the ultimate destination.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Puma | Puma | * | 4.3.12 (excluding) |
| Puma | Puma | 5.0.0 (including) | 5.6.4 (excluding) |
| Puma | Ubuntu | esm-apps/focal | * |
| Puma | Ubuntu | esm-apps/jammy | * |
| Puma | Ubuntu | focal | * |
| Puma | Ubuntu | impish | * |
| Puma | Ubuntu | jammy | * |
| Puma | Ubuntu | kinetic | * |
| Puma | Ubuntu | trusty | * |
| Puma | Ubuntu | xenial | * |
| Red Hat Gluster Storage 3.5 for RHEL 7 | RedHat | rubygem-puma-0:4.3.12-1.el7rhgs | * |
| Red Hat Satellite 6.9 for RHEL 7 | RedHat | tfm-rubygem-puma-0:4.3.12-1.el7sat | * |
HTTP requests or responses (“messages”) can be malformed or unexpected in ways that cause web servers or clients to interpret the messages in different ways than intermediary HTTP agents such as load balancers, reverse proxies, web caching proxies, application firewalls, etc. For example, an adversary may be able to add duplicate or different header fields that a client or server might interpret as one set of messages, whereas the intermediary might interpret the same sequence of bytes as a different set of messages. For example, discrepancies can arise in how to handle duplicate headers like two Transfer-encoding (TE) or two Content-length (CL), or the malicious HTTP message will have different headers for TE and CL. The inconsistent parsing and interpretation of messages can allow the adversary to “smuggle” a message to the client/server without the intermediary being aware of it. This weakness is usually the result of the usage of outdated or incompatible HTTP protocol versions in the HTTP agents.