A deserialization vulnerability in a .NET framework class used and not properly checked by Safety Designer all versions up to and including 1.11.0 allows an attacker to craft malicious project files. Opening/importing such a malicious project file would execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the current user when opened or imported by the Safety Designer. This compromises confidentiality integrity and availability. For the attack to succeed a user must manually open a malicious project file.
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently verifying that the resulting data will be valid.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Safety_designer | Sick | * | 1.11.0 (including) |
It is often convenient to serialize objects for communication or to save them for later use. However, deserialized data or code can often be modified without using the provided accessor functions if it does not use cryptography to protect itself. Furthermore, any cryptography would still be client-side security – which is a dangerous security assumption. Data that is untrusted can not be trusted to be well-formed. When developers place no restrictions on “gadget chains,” or series of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process (i.e., before the object is returned to the caller), it is sometimes possible for attackers to leverage them to perform unauthorized actions, like generating a shell.