A flaw was found in Undertow. Denial of service can be achieved as Undertow server waits for the LAST_CHUNK forever for EJB invocations.
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.
Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
---|---|---|---|
Integration_camel_k | Redhat | - (including) | - (including) |
Jboss_enterprise_application_platform | Redhat | 7.0.0 (including) | 7.0.0 (including) |
Jboss_fuse | Redhat | 7.0.0 (including) | 7.0.0 (including) |
Single_sign-on | Redhat | 7.0 (including) | 7.0 (including) |
Undertow | Redhat | 2.0.0 (including) | 2.2.19 (including) |
Undertow | Redhat | 2.3.0-alpha1 (including) | 2.3.0-alpha1 (including) |
Undertow | Redhat | 2.3.0-alpha2 (including) | 2.3.0-alpha2 (including) |
EAP 7.4.8 release | RedHat | undertow | * |
Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 7.4 for RHEL 8 | RedHat | eap7-undertow-0:2.2.20-1.SP1_redhat_00001.1.el8eap | * |
Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 7.4 for RHEL 9 | RedHat | eap7-undertow-0:2.2.20-1.SP1_redhat_00001.1.el9eap | * |
Red Hat JBoss Enterprise Application Platform 7.4 on RHEL 7 | RedHat | eap7-undertow-0:2.2.20-1.SP1_redhat_00001.1.el7eap | * |
Red Hat Single Sign-On 7 | RedHat | undertow | * |
Red Hat Single Sign-On 7.6 for RHEL 7 | RedHat | rh-sso7-keycloak-0:18.0.6-1.redhat_00001.1.el7sso | * |
Red Hat Single Sign-On 7.6 for RHEL 8 | RedHat | rh-sso7-keycloak-0:18.0.6-1.redhat_00001.1.el8sso | * |
Red Hat Single Sign-On 7.6 for RHEL 9 | RedHat | rh-sso7-keycloak-0:18.0.6-1.redhat_00001.1.el9sso | * |
RHEL-8 based Middleware Containers | RedHat | rh-sso-7/sso76-openshift-rhel8:7.6-20 | * |
Undertow | Ubuntu | bionic | * |
Undertow | Ubuntu | focal | * |
Undertow | Ubuntu | kinetic | * |
Undertow | Ubuntu | oracular | * |
Undertow | Ubuntu | xenial | * |
Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute – and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.