Poetry is a dependency manager for Python. When handling dependencies that come from a Git repository instead of a registry, Poetry uses various commands, such as git clone
. These commands are constructed using user input (e.g. the repository URL). When building the commands, Poetry correctly avoids Command Injection vulnerabilities by passing an array of arguments instead of a command string. However, there is the possibility that a user input starts with a dash (-
) and is therefore treated as an optional argument instead of a positional one. This can lead to Code Execution because some of the commands have options that can be leveraged to run arbitrary executables. If a developer is exploited, the attacker could steal credentials or persist their access. If the exploit happens on a server, the attackers could use their access to attack other internal systems. Since this vulnerability requires a fair amount of user interaction, it is not as dangerous as a remotely exploitable one. However, it still puts developers at risk when dealing with untrusted files in a way they think is safe, because the exploit still works when the victim tries to make sure nothing can happen, e.g. by vetting any Git or Poetry config files that might be present in the directory. Versions 1.1.9 and 1.2.0b1 contain patches for this issue.
The product constructs a string for a command to be executed by a separate component in another control sphere, but it does not properly delimit the intended arguments, options, or switches within that command string.
Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
---|---|---|---|
Poetry | Python-poetry | * | 1.1.9 (excluding) |
Poetry | Python-poetry | 1.2.0-alpha1 (including) | 1.2.0-alpha1 (including) |
Poetry | Python-poetry | 1.2.0-alpha2 (including) | 1.2.0-alpha2 (including) |
When creating commands using interpolation into a string, developers may assume that only the arguments/options that they specify will be processed. This assumption may be even stronger when the programmer has encoded the command in a way that prevents separate commands from being provided maliciously, e.g. in the case of shell metacharacters. When constructing the command, the developer may use whitespace or other delimiters that are required to separate arguments when the command. However, if an attacker can provide an untrusted input that contains argument-separating delimiters, then the resulting command will have more arguments than intended by the developer. The attacker may then be able to change the behavior of the command. Depending on the functionality supported by the extraneous arguments, this may have security-relevant consequences.