The PlexTrac platform prior to version 1.28.0 allows for username enumeration via HTTP response times on invalid login attempts for users configured to use the PlexTrac authentication provider. Login attempts for valid, unlocked users configured to use PlexTrac as their authentication provider take significantly longer than those for invalid users, allowing for valid users to be enumerated by an unauthenticated remote attacker. Note that the lockout policy implemented in Plextrac version 1.17.0 makes it impossible to distinguish between valid, locked user accounts and user accounts that do not exist, but does not prevent valid, unlocked users from being enumerated.
Weakness
The product behaves differently or sends different responses under different circumstances in a way that is observable to an unauthorized actor, which exposes security-relevant information about the state of the product, such as whether a particular operation was successful or not.
Affected Software
| Name |
Vendor |
Start Version |
End Version |
| Plextrac |
Plextrac |
* |
1.28.0 (excluding) |
Potential Mitigations
- Compartmentalize the system to have “safe” areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
- Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
References