conduit-hyper integrates a conduit application with the hyper server. Prior to version 0.4.2, conduit-hyper did not check any limit on a requests length before calling hyper::body::to_bytes. An attacker could send a malicious request with an abnormally large Content-Length, which could lead to a panic if memory allocation failed for that request. In version 0.4.2, conduit-hyper sets an internal limit of 128 MiB per request, otherwise returning status 400 (Bad Request). This crate is part of the implementation of Rusts crates.io, but that service is not affected due to its existing cloud infrastructure, which already drops such malicious requests. Even with the new limit in place, conduit-hyper is not recommended for production use, nor to directly serve the public Internet.
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conduit-hyper | Conduit-hyper_project | 0.2.0 (excluding) | 0.4.2 (excluding) |
| Conduit-hyper | Conduit-hyper_project | 0.2.0 (including) | 0.2.0 (including) |
| Conduit-hyper | Conduit-hyper_project | 0.2.0-alpha3 (including) | 0.2.0-alpha3 (including) |
| Conduit-hyper | Conduit-hyper_project | 0.2.0-alpha4 (including) | 0.2.0-alpha4 (including) |
Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute – and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.