The Netskope client service (prior to R96) on Windows runs as NT AUTHORITYSYSTEM which writes log files to a writable directory (C:UsersPublicnetSkope) for a standard user. The files are created and written with a SYSTEM account except one file (logplaceholder) which inherits permission giving all users full access control list. Netskope client restricts access to this file by allowing only read permissions as a standard user. Whenever the Netskope client service restarts, it deletes the logplaceholder and recreates, creating a race condition, which can be exploited by a malicious local user to create the file and set ACL permissions on the file. Once the file is created by a malicious user with proper ACL permissions, all files within C:UsersPublicnetSkope becomes modifiable by the unprivileged user. By using Windows pseudo-symlink, these files can be pointed to other places in the system and thus malicious users will be able to elevate privileges.
The product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource’s state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check. This can cause the product to perform invalid actions when the resource is in an unexpected state.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Netskope | Netskope | * | 100 (excluding) |