The administrative web interface of a Netgear C7800 Router running firmware version 6.01.07 (and possibly others) authenticates users via basic authentication, with an HTTP header containing a base64 value of the plaintext username and password. Because the web server also does not utilize transport security by default, this renders the administrative credentials vulnerable to eavesdropping by an adversary during every authenticated request made by a client to the router over a WLAN, or a LAN, should the adversary be able to perform a man-in-the-middle attack.
The product transmits sensitive or security-critical data in cleartext in a communication channel that can be sniffed by unauthorized actors.
Many communication channels can be “sniffed” (monitored) by adversaries during data transmission. For example, in networking, packets can traverse many intermediary nodes from the source to the destination, whether across the internet, an internal network, the cloud, etc. Some actors might have privileged access to a network interface or any link along the channel, such as a router, but they might not be authorized to collect the underlying data. As a result, network traffic could be sniffed by adversaries, spilling security-critical data. Applicable communication channels are not limited to software products. Applicable channels include hardware-specific technologies such as internal hardware networks and external debug channels, supporting remote JTAG debugging. When mitigations are not applied to combat adversaries within the product’s threat model, this weakness significantly lowers the difficulty of exploitation by such adversaries. When full communications are recorded or logged, such as with a packet dump, an adversary could attempt to obtain the dump long after the transmission has occurred and try to “sniff” the cleartext from the recorded communications in the dump itself.