The web-based admin console in H2 Database Engine before 2.2.220 can be started via the CLI with the argument -webAdminPassword, which allows the user to specify the password in cleartext for the web admin console. Consequently, a local user (or an attacker that has obtained local access through some means) would be able to discover the password by listing processes and their arguments. NOTE: the vendor states This is not a vulnerability of H2 Console … Passwords should never be passed on the command line and every qualified DBA or system administrator is expected to know that. Nonetheless, the issue was fixed in 2.2.220.
The product stores sensitive information in cleartext within a resource that might be accessible to another control sphere.
Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
---|---|---|---|
H2 | H2database | * | 2.1.214 (including) |
H2database | Ubuntu | bionic | * |
H2database | Ubuntu | kinetic | * |
H2database | Ubuntu | lunar | * |
H2database | Ubuntu | mantic | * |
H2database | Ubuntu | trusty | * |
H2database | Ubuntu | xenial | * |
Jameica-h2database | Ubuntu | trusty | * |
Jameica-h2database | Ubuntu | xenial | * |
Mediathekview | Ubuntu | trusty | * |
Mediathekview | Ubuntu | xenial | * |
Because the information is stored in cleartext (i.e., unencrypted), attackers could potentially read it. Even if the information is encoded in a way that is not human-readable, certain techniques could determine which encoding is being used, then decode the information. When organizations adopt cloud services, it can be easier for attackers to access the data from anywhere on the Internet. In some systems/environments such as cloud, the use of “double encryption” (at both the software and hardware layer) might be required, and the developer might be solely responsible for both layers, instead of shared responsibility with the administrator of the broader system/environment.