CVE-2022-48941

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ice: fix concurrent reset and removal of VFs

Commit c503e63200c6 (ice: Stop processing VF messages during teardown) introduced a driver state flag, ICE_VF_DEINIT_IN_PROGRESS, which is intended to prevent some issues with concurrently handling messages from VFs while tearing down the VFs.

This change was motivated by crashes caused while tearing down and bringing up VFs in rapid succession.

It turns out that the fix actually introduces issues with the VF driver caused because the PF no longer responds to any messages sent by the VF during its .remove routine. This results in the VF potentially removing its DMA memory before the PF has shut down the device queues.

Additionally, the fix doesnt actually resolve concurrency issues within the ice driver. It is possible for a VF to initiate a reset just prior to the ice driver removing VFs. This can result in the remove task concurrently operating while the VF is being reset. This results in similar memory corruption and panics purportedly fixed by that commit.

Fix this concurrency at its root by protecting both the reset and removal flows using the existing VF cfg_lock. This ensures that we cannot remove the VF while any outstanding critical tasks such as a virtchnl message or a reset are occurring.

This locking change also fixes the root cause originally fixed by commit c503e63200c6 (ice: Stop processing VF messages during teardown), so we can simply revert it.

Note that I kept these two changes together because simply reverting the original commit alone would leave the driver vulnerable to worse race conditions.

Weakness

The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.

Affected Software

Extended Description

A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and it is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc. A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:

A race condition exists when an “interfering code sequence” can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. The interfering code sequence could be “trusted” or “untrusted.” A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the product; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable product.

Potential Mitigations

• Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring.
• Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).

Related Attack Patterns

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/26.html
• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/29.html

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a3e61de89bab6696aa28b70030eb119968c5586
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3c805fce07c9dbc47d8a9129c7c5458025951957
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fadead80fe4c033b5e514fcbadd20b55c4494112