CVE-2022-50044

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: qrtr: start MHI channel after endpoit creation

MHI channel may generates event/interrupt right after enabling. It may leads to 2 race conditions issues.

Such event may be dropped by qcom_mhi_qrtr_dl_callback() at check:

if (!qdev || mhi_res->transaction_status)
	return;

Because dev_set_drvdata(&mhi_dev->dev, qdev) may be not performed at this moment. In this situation qrtr-ns will be unable to enumerate services in device.

Such event may come at the moment after dev_set_drvdata() and before qrtr_endpoint_register(). In this case kernel will panic with accessing wrong pointer at qcom_mhi_qrtr_dl_callback():

rc = qrtr_endpoint_post(&qdev->ep, mhi_res->buf_addr,
			mhi_res->bytes_xferd);

Because endpoint is not created yet.

So move mhi_prepare_for_transfer_autoqueue after endpoint creation to fix it.

Weakness

The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.

Affected Software

Extended Description

A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and it is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc. A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:

A race condition exists when an “interfering code sequence” can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. The interfering code sequence could be “trusted” or “untrusted.” A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the product; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable product.

Potential Mitigations

• Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring.
• Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).

Related Attack Patterns

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/26.html
• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/29.html

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/68a838b84effb7b57ba7d50b1863fc6ae35a54ce
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a1a75f78a2937567946b1b756f82462874b5ca20
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c682fb70a7dfc25b848a4ff3a385b0471b470606