CVE Vulnerabilities

CVE-2023-1729

Out-of-bounds Write

Published: May 15, 2023 | Modified: Jul 10, 2024
CVSS 3.x
6.5
MEDIUM
Source:
NVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
CVSS 2.x
RedHat/V2
RedHat/V3
3.3 LOW
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Ubuntu
MEDIUM

A flaw was found in LibRaw. A heap-buffer-overflow in raw2image_ex() caused by a maliciously crafted file may lead to an application crash.

Weakness

The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.

Affected Software

Name Vendor Start Version End Version
Libraw Libraw * 0.21.2 (excluding)
Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 RedHat LibRaw-0:0.21.1-1.el9 *
Darktable Ubuntu bionic *
Darktable Ubuntu kinetic *
Darktable Ubuntu lunar *
Darktable Ubuntu mantic *
Darktable Ubuntu trusty *
Darktable Ubuntu xenial *
Dcraw Ubuntu bionic *
Dcraw Ubuntu kinetic *
Dcraw Ubuntu lunar *
Dcraw Ubuntu mantic *
Dcraw Ubuntu trusty *
Dcraw Ubuntu xenial *
Digikam Ubuntu bionic *
Digikam Ubuntu kinetic *
Digikam Ubuntu lunar *
Digikam Ubuntu mantic *
Digikam Ubuntu trusty *
Digikam Ubuntu xenial *
Exactimage Ubuntu bionic *
Exactimage Ubuntu kinetic *
Exactimage Ubuntu lunar *
Exactimage Ubuntu mantic *
Exactimage Ubuntu trusty *
Exactimage Ubuntu xenial *
Kodi Ubuntu bionic *
Kodi Ubuntu kinetic *
Kodi Ubuntu lunar *
Kodi Ubuntu mantic *
Kodi Ubuntu xenial *
Libraw Ubuntu bionic *
Libraw Ubuntu devel *
Libraw Ubuntu focal *
Libraw Ubuntu jammy *
Libraw Ubuntu kinetic *
Libraw Ubuntu lunar *
Libraw Ubuntu mantic *
Libraw Ubuntu noble *
Libraw Ubuntu oracular *
Libraw Ubuntu trusty *
Libraw Ubuntu upstream *
Libraw Ubuntu xenial *
Rawtherapee Ubuntu bionic *
Rawtherapee Ubuntu kinetic *
Rawtherapee Ubuntu lunar *
Rawtherapee Ubuntu mantic *
Rawtherapee Ubuntu trusty *
Rawtherapee Ubuntu xenial *
Ufraw Ubuntu bionic *
Ufraw Ubuntu trusty *
Ufraw Ubuntu xenial *
Xbmc Ubuntu trusty *

Potential Mitigations

  • Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

  • For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.

  • Be wary that a language’s interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

  • Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.

  • Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

  • D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

  • Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application’s memory:

  • Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program’s executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

  • Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as “rebasing” (for Windows) and “prelinking” (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

  • For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

  • Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

  • For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

References