Netdata is an open source option for real-time infrastructure monitoring and troubleshooting. An attacker with the ability to establish a streaming connection can execute arbitrary commands on the targeted Netdata agent. When an alert is triggered, the function health_alarm_execute is called. This function performs different checks and then enqueues a command by calling spawn_enq_cmd. This command is populated with several arguments that are not sanitized. One of them is the registry_hostname of the node for which the alert is raised. By providing a specially crafted registry_hostname as part of the health data that is streamed to a Netdata (parent) agent, an attacker can execute arbitrary commands at the remote host as a side-effect of the raised alert. Note that the commands are executed as the user running the Netdata Agent. This user is usually named netdata. The ability to run arbitrary commands may allow an attacker to escalate privileges by escalating other vulnerabilities in the system, as that user. The problem has been fixed in: Netdata agent v1.37 (stable) and Netdata agent v1.36.0-409 (nightly). As a workaround, streaming is not enabled by default. If you have previously enabled this, it can be disabled. Limiting access to the port on the recipient Agent to trusted child connections may mitigate the impact of this vulnerability.
Weakness
The product receives input or data, but it does
not validate or incorrectly validates that the input has the
properties that are required to process the data safely and
correctly.
Affected Software
| Name |
Vendor |
Start Version |
End Version |
| Netdata |
Netdata |
* |
1.37.0 (excluding) |
| Netdata |
Ubuntu |
bionic |
* |
| Netdata |
Ubuntu |
kinetic |
* |
| Netdata |
Ubuntu |
lunar |
* |
| Netdata |
Ubuntu |
mantic |
* |
| Netdata |
Ubuntu |
trusty |
* |
| Netdata |
Ubuntu |
upstream |
* |
| Netdata |
Ubuntu |
xenial |
* |
Extended Description
Input validation is a frequently-used technique
for checking potentially dangerous inputs in order to
ensure that the inputs are safe for processing within the
code, or when communicating with other components.
Input can consist of:
Data can be simple or structured. Structured data
can be composed of many nested layers, composed of
combinations of metadata and raw data, with other simple or
structured data.
Many properties of raw data or metadata may need
to be validated upon entry into the code, such
as:
Implied or derived properties of data must often
be calculated or inferred by the code itself. Errors in
deriving properties may be considered a contributing factor
to improper input validation.
Potential Mitigations
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an “accept known good” input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, “boat” may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as “red” or “blue.”
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code’s environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
- Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application’s current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.
- Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
References