An issue was discovered in TigerGraph Enterprise Free Edition 3.x. There is logging of user credentials. All authenticated GSQL access requests are logged by TigerGraph in multiple places. Each request includes both the username and password of the user in an easily decodable base64 form. That could allow a TigerGraph administrator to effectively harvest usernames/passwords.
The product stores sensitive information in cleartext within a resource that might be accessible to another control sphere.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cloud | Tigergraph | - (including) | - (including) |
| Tigergraph_enterprise | Tigergraph | 3.7.0 (including) | 3.7.0 (including) |
Because the information is stored in cleartext (i.e., unencrypted), attackers could potentially read it. Even if the information is encoded in a way that is not human-readable, certain techniques could determine which encoding is being used, then decode the information. When organizations adopt cloud services, it can be easier for attackers to access the data from anywhere on the Internet. In some systems/environments such as cloud, the use of “double encryption” (at both the software and hardware layer) might be required, and the developer might be solely responsible for both layers, instead of shared responsibility with the administrator of the broader system/environment.