The filename parameter of the Context.FileAttachment function is not properly sanitized. A maliciously crafted filename can cause the Content-Disposition header to be sent with an unexpected filename value or otherwise modify the Content-Disposition header. For example, a filename of setup.bat";x=.txt will be sent as a file named setup.bat. If the FileAttachment function is called with names provided by an untrusted source, this may permit an attacker to cause a file to be served with a name different than provided. Maliciously crafted attachment file name can modify the Content-Disposition header.
The product downloads source code or an executable from a remote location and executes the code without sufficiently verifying the origin and integrity of the code.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Gin | Gin-gonic | 1.3.1-0.20190301021747-ccb9e902956d (including) | 1.9.1 (excluding) |
| Migration Toolkit for Virtualization 2.5 | RedHat | migration-toolkit-virtualization/mtv-controller-rhel9:2.5.2-5 | * |
| Migration Toolkit for Virtualization 2.5 | RedHat | migration-toolkit-virtualization/mtv-must-gather-api-rhel8:2.5.2-6 | * |
| Red Hat Migration Toolkit for Containers 1.7 | RedHat | rhmtc/openshift-migration-controller-rhel8:v1.7.11-4 | * |
| Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.14 | RedHat | openshift4/ose-image-customization-controller-rhel8:v4.14.0-202310201027.p0.g2dda87a.assembly.stream | * |
| Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.14 | RedHat | openshift4/ose-agent-installer-api-server-rhel8:v4.14.0-202410151739.p0.gcb552db.assembly.stream.el8 | * |
| Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.14 | RedHat | openshift4/ose-agent-installer-csr-approver-rhel8:v4.14.0-202410220407.p0.g53ccc48.assembly.stream.el8 | * |
| Golang-github-gin-gonic-gin | Ubuntu | bionic | * |
| Golang-github-gin-gonic-gin | Ubuntu | kinetic | * |
| Golang-github-gin-gonic-gin | Ubuntu | lunar | * |
| Golang-github-gin-gonic-gin | Ubuntu | mantic | * |
| Golang-github-gin-gonic-gin | Ubuntu | trusty | * |
| Golang-github-gin-gonic-gin | Ubuntu | xenial | * |
Encrypt the code with a reliable encryption scheme before transmitting.
This will only be a partial solution, since it will not detect DNS spoofing and it will not prevent your code from being modified on the hosting site.
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Speficially, it may be helpful to use tools or frameworks to perform integrity checking on the transmitted code.
Run the code in a “jail” or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.