Parse Server is an open source backend that can be deployed to any infrastructure that can run Node.js. Versions prior to 5.4.4 and 6.1.1 are vulnerable to a phishing attack vulnerability that involves a user uploading malicious files. A malicious user could upload an HTML file to Parse Server via its public API. That HTML file would then be accessible at the internet domain at which Parse Server is hosted. The URL of the the uploaded HTML could be shared for phishing attacks. The HTML page may seem legitimate because it is served under the internet domain where Parse Server is hosted, which may be the same as a companys official website domain.
An additional security issue arises when the Parse JavaScript SDK is used. The SDK stores sessions in the internet browsers local storage, which usually restricts data access depending on the internet domain. A malicious HTML file could contain a script that retrieves the users session token from local storage and then share it with the attacker.
The fix included in versions 5.4.4 and 6.1.1 adds a new Parse Server option fileUpload.fileExtensions to restrict file upload on Parse Server by file extension. It is recommended to restrict file upload for HTML file extensions, which this fix disables by default. If an app requires upload of files with HTML file extensions, the option can be set to [.*] or another custom value to override the default.
Weakness
The product allows the attacker to upload or transfer files of dangerous types that can be automatically processed within the product’s environment.
Affected Software
| Name |
Vendor |
Start Version |
End Version |
| Parse-server |
Parseplatform |
* |
5.4.4 (excluding) |
| Parse-server |
Parseplatform |
6.0.0 (including) |
6.1.1 (excluding) |
Potential Mitigations
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an “accept known good” input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, “boat” may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as “red” or “blue.”
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code’s environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- For example, limiting filenames to alphanumeric characters can help to restrict the introduction of unintended file extensions.
- Run the code in a “jail” or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
References