Highlight is an open source, full-stack monitoring platform. Highlight may record passwords on customer deployments when a password html input is switched to type=text via a javascript Show Password button. This differs from the expected behavior which always obfuscates type=password inputs. A customer may assume that switching to type=text would also not record this input; hence, they would not add additional highlight-mask css-class obfuscation to this part of the DOM, resulting in unintentional recording of a password value when a Show Password button is used. This issue was patched in version 6.0.0.
This patch tracks changes to the type attribute of an input to ensure an input that used to be a type=password continues to be obfuscated.
The product transmits sensitive or security-critical data in cleartext in a communication channel that can be sniffed by unauthorized actors.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Highlight | Highlight | * | 6.0.0 (excluding) |
Many communication channels can be “sniffed” (monitored) by adversaries during data transmission. For example, in networking, packets can traverse many intermediary nodes from the source to the destination, whether across the internet, an internal network, the cloud, etc. Some actors might have privileged access to a network interface or any link along the channel, such as a router, but they might not be authorized to collect the underlying data. As a result, network traffic could be sniffed by adversaries, spilling security-critical data. Applicable communication channels are not limited to software products. Applicable channels include hardware-specific technologies such as internal hardware networks and external debug channels, supporting remote JTAG debugging. When mitigations are not applied to combat adversaries within the product’s threat model, this weakness significantly lowers the difficulty of exploitation by such adversaries. When full communications are recorded or logged, such as with a packet dump, an adversary could attempt to obtain the dump long after the transmission has occurred and try to “sniff” the cleartext from the recorded communications in the dump itself.