Omni-notes is an open source note-taking application for Android. The Omni-notes Android app had an insufficient path validation vulnerability when displaying the details of a note received through an externally-provided intent. The paths of the notes attachments were not properly validated, allowing malicious or compromised applications in the same device to force Omni-notes to copy files from its internal storage to its external storage directory, where they would have become accessible to any component with permission to read the external storage. Updating to the newest version (6.2.7) of Omni-notes Android fixes this vulnerability.
The product receives a request, message, or directive from an upstream component, but the product does not sufficiently preserve the original source of the request before forwarding the request to an external actor that is outside of the product’s control sphere. This causes the product to appear to be the source of the request, leading it to act as a proxy or other intermediary between the upstream component and the external actor.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Omni_notes | Omninotes | * | 6.2.6 (including) |
If an attacker cannot directly contact a target, but the product has access to the target, then the attacker can send a request to the product and have it be forwarded to the target. The request would appear to be coming from the product’s system, not the attacker’s system. As a result, the attacker can bypass access controls (such as firewalls) or hide the source of malicious requests, since the requests would not be coming directly from the attacker. Since proxy functionality and message-forwarding often serve a legitimate purpose, this issue only becomes a vulnerability when: