In Spring for Apache Kafka 3.0.9 and earlier and versions 2.9.10 and earlier, a possible deserialization attack vector existed, but only if unusual configuration was applied. An attacker would have to construct a malicious serialized object in one of the deserialization exception record headers.
Specifically, an application is vulnerable when all of the following are true:
By default, these properties are false, and the container only attempts to deserialize the headers if an ErrorHandlingDeserializer is configured. The ErrorHandlingDeserializer prevents the vulnerability by removing any such malicious headers before processing the record.
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently verifying that the resulting data will be valid.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Spring_for_apache_kafka | Vmware | 2.8.1 (including) | 2.9.10 (including) |
| Spring_for_apache_kafka | Vmware | 3.0.0 (including) | 3.0.9 (including) |
It is often convenient to serialize objects for communication or to save them for later use. However, deserialized data or code can often be modified without using the provided accessor functions if it does not use cryptography to protect itself. Furthermore, any cryptography would still be client-side security – which is a dangerous security assumption. Data that is untrusted can not be trusted to be well-formed. When developers place no restrictions on “gadget chains,” or series of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process (i.e., before the object is returned to the caller), it is sometimes possible for attackers to leverage them to perform unauthorized actions, like generating a shell.