In spring AMQP versions 1.0.0 to 2.4.16 and 3.0.0 to 3.0.9 , allowed list patterns for deserializable class names were added to Spring AMQP, allowing users to lock down deserialization of data in messages from untrusted sources; however by default, when no allowed list was provided, all classes could be deserialized.
Specifically, an application is vulnerable if
the SimpleMessageConverter or SerializerMessageConverter is used
the user does not configure allowed list patterns
untrusted message originators gain permissions to write messages to the RabbitMQ broker to send malicious content
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently verifying that the resulting data will be valid.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Spring_advanced_message_queuing_protocol | Vmware | 1.0.0 (including) | 2.4.16 (excluding) |
| Spring_advanced_message_queuing_protocol | Vmware | 3.0.0 (including) | 3.0.9 (excluding) |
| AMQ Clients | RedHat | org.amqphub.spring-amqp-10-jms-spring-boot-parent | * |
It is often convenient to serialize objects for communication or to save them for later use. However, deserialized data or code can often be modified without using the provided accessor functions if it does not use cryptography to protect itself. Furthermore, any cryptography would still be client-side security – which is a dangerous security assumption. Data that is untrusted can not be trusted to be well-formed. When developers place no restrictions on “gadget chains,” or series of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process (i.e., before the object is returned to the caller), it is sometimes possible for attackers to leverage them to perform unauthorized actions, like generating a shell.