Envoy is a cloud-native high-performance edge/middle/service proxy. Envoy’s HTTP/2 codec may leak a header map and bookkeeping structures upon receiving RST_STREAM immediately followed by the GOAWAY frames from an upstream server. In nghttp2, cleanup of pending requests due to receipt of the GOAWAY frame skips de-allocation of the bookkeeping structure and pending compressed header. The error return [code path] is taken if connection is already marked for not sending more requests due to GOAWAY frame. The clean-up code is right after the return statement, causing memory leak. Denial of service through memory exhaustion. This vulnerability was patched in versions(s) 1.26.3, 1.25.8, 1.24.9, 1.23.11.
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Envoy | Envoyproxy | * | 1.23.11 (excluding) |
| Envoy | Envoyproxy | 1.24.0 (including) | 1.24.9 (excluding) |
| Envoy | Envoyproxy | 1.25.0 (including) | 1.25.8 (excluding) |
| Envoy | Envoyproxy | 1.26.0 (including) | 1.26.3 (excluding) |
| Red Hat OpenShift Service Mesh 2.2 for RHEL 8 | RedHat | openshift-service-mesh/proxyv2-rhel8:2.2.10-3 | * |
| Red Hat OpenShift Service Mesh 2.3 for RHEL 8 | RedHat | openshift-service-mesh/proxyv2-rhel8:2.3.6-4 | * |
| Red Hat OpenShift Service Mesh 2.4 for RHEL 8 | RedHat | openshift-service-mesh/proxyv2-rhel8:2.4.2-7 | * |
Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute – and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.