Auto-GPT is an experimental open-source application showcasing the capabilities of the GPT-4 language model. When Auto-GPT is executed directly on the host system via the provided run.sh or run.bat files, custom Python code execution is sandboxed using a temporary dedicated docker container which should not have access to any files outside of the Auto-GPT workspace directory.
Before v0.4.3, the execute_python_code
command (introduced in v0.4.1) does not sanitize the basename
arg before writing LLM-supplied code to a file with an LLM-supplied name. This allows for a path traversal attack that can overwrite any .py file outside the workspace directory by specifying a basename
such as ../../../main.py
. This can further be abused to achieve arbitrary code execution on the host running Auto-GPT by e.g. overwriting autogpt/main.py which will be executed outside of the docker environment meant to sandbox custom python code execution the next time Auto-GPT is started. The issue has been patched in version 0.4.3. As a workaround, the risk introduced by this vulnerability can be remediated by running Auto-GPT in a virtual machine, or another environment in which damage to files or corruption of the program is not a critical problem.
The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment.
Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
---|---|---|---|
Auto-gpt | Agpt | * | 0.4.3 (excluding) |
When a product allows a user’s input to contain code syntax, it might be possible for an attacker to craft the code in such a way that it will alter the intended control flow of the product. Such an alteration could lead to arbitrary code execution. Injection problems encompass a wide variety of issues – all mitigated in very different ways. For this reason, the most effective way to discuss these weaknesses is to note the distinct features which classify them as injection weaknesses. The most important issue to note is that all injection problems share one thing in common – i.e., they allow for the injection of control plane data into the user-controlled data plane. This means that the execution of the process may be altered by sending code in through legitimate data channels, using no other mechanism. While buffer overflows, and many other flaws, involve the use of some further issue to gain execution, injection problems need only for the data to be parsed. The most classic instantiations of this category of weakness are SQL injection and format string vulnerabilities.