An attacker can use SnakeYAML to deserialize java.net.URLClassLoader and make it load a JAR from a specified URL, and then deserialize javax.script.ScriptEngineManager to load code using that ClassLoader. This unbounded deserialization can likely lead to remote code execution. The code can be run in Helix REST start and Workflow creation.
Affect all the versions lower and include 1.2.0.
Affected products: helix-core, helix-rest
Mitigation: Short term, stop using any YAML based configuration and workflow creation. Long term, all Helix version bumping up to 1.3.0
The product deserializes untrusted data without sufficiently verifying that the resulting data will be valid.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Helix | Apache | * | 1.3.0 (excluding) |
It is often convenient to serialize objects for communication or to save them for later use. However, deserialized data or code can often be modified without using the provided accessor functions if it does not use cryptography to protect itself. Furthermore, any cryptography would still be client-side security – which is a dangerous security assumption. Data that is untrusted can not be trusted to be well-formed. When developers place no restrictions on “gadget chains,” or series of instances and method invocations that can self-execute during the deserialization process (i.e., before the object is returned to the caller), it is sometimes possible for attackers to leverage them to perform unauthorized actions, like generating a shell.