Argo CD is a declarative continuous deployment for Kubernetes. All versions of ArgoCD starting from v2.4 have a bug where the ArgoCD repo-server component is vulnerable to a Denial-of-Service attack vector. Specifically, the said component extracts a user-controlled tar.gz file without validating the size of its inner files. As a result, a malicious, low-privileged user can send a malicious tar.gz file that exploits this vulnerability to the repo-server, thereby harming the systems functionality and availability. Additionally, the repo-server is susceptible to another vulnerability due to the fact that it does not check the extracted file permissions before attempting to delete them. Consequently, an attacker can craft a malicious tar.gz archive in a way that prevents the deletion of its inner files when the manifest generation process is completed. A patch for this vulnerability has been released in versions 2.6.15, 2.7.14, and 2.8.3. Users are advised to upgrade. The only way to completely resolve the issue is to upgrade, however users unable to upgrade should configure RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) and provide access for configuring applications only to a limited number of administrators. These administrators should utilize trusted and verified Helm charts.
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Argo_continuous_delivery | Linuxfoundation | 2.4.0 (including) | 2.6.15 (excluding) |
| Argo_continuous_delivery | Linuxfoundation | 2.7.0 (including) | 2.7.14 (excluding) |
| Argo_continuous_delivery | Linuxfoundation | 2.8.0 (including) | 2.8.3 (excluding) |
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the product, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system. There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute – and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.