Foxit PDF Reader templates Use-After-Free Information Disclosure Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to disclose sensitive information on affected installations of Foxit PDF Reader. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file.
The specific flaw exists within the handling of templates. The issue results from the lack of validating the existence of an object prior to performing operations on the object. An attacker can leverage this in conjunction with other vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code in the context of the current process. Was ZDI-CAN-21586.
Referencing memory after it has been freed can cause a program to crash, use unexpected values, or execute code.
Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
---|---|---|---|
Pdf_editor | Foxit | * | 10.1.12.37872 (including) |
Pdf_editor | Foxit | 11.0.0 (including) | 11.2.7.53812 (including) |
Pdf_editor | Foxit | 12.0.0 (including) | 12.1.3.15356 (including) |
Pdf_editor | Foxit | 2023.1.0.15510 (including) | 2023.1.0.15510 (including) |
Pdf_editor_for_mac | Foxit | 11.0.0 (including) | 11.1.5.0913 (including) |
Pdf_editor_for_mac | Foxit | 12.0.0 (including) | 12.1.1.55342 (including) |
Pdf_reader | Foxit | * | 12.1.3.15356 (including) |
The use of previously-freed memory can have any number of adverse consequences, ranging from the corruption of valid data to the execution of arbitrary code, depending on the instantiation and timing of the flaw. The simplest way data corruption may occur involves the system’s reuse of the freed memory. Use-after-free errors have two common and sometimes overlapping causes:
In this scenario, the memory in question is allocated to another pointer validly at some point after it has been freed. The original pointer to the freed memory is used again and points to somewhere within the new allocation. As the data is changed, it corrupts the validly used memory; this induces undefined behavior in the process. If the newly allocated data happens to hold a class, in C++ for example, various function pointers may be scattered within the heap data. If one of these function pointers is overwritten with an address to valid shellcode, execution of arbitrary code can be achieved.