Vyper is a Pythonic Smart Contract Language for the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM). In version 0.3.9 and prior, under certain conditions, the memory used by the builtins raw_call, create_from_blueprint and create_copy_of can be corrupted. For raw_call, the argument buffer of the call can be corrupted, leading to incorrect calldata in the sub-context. For create_from_blueprint and create_copy_of, the buffer for the to-be-deployed bytecode can be corrupted, leading to deploying incorrect bytecode.
Each builtin has conditions that must be fulfilled for the corruption to happen. For raw_call, the data argument of the builtin must be msg.data and the value or gas passed to the builtin must be some complex expression that results in writing to the memory. For create_copy_of, the value or salt passed to the builtin must be some complex expression that results in writing to the memory. For create_from_blueprint, either no constructor parameters should be passed to the builtin or raw_args should be set to True, and the value or salt passed to the builtin must be some complex expression that results in writing to the memory.
As of time of publication, no patched version exists. The issue is still being investigated, and there might be other cases where the corruption might happen. When the builtin is being called from an internal function F, the issue is not present provided that the function calling F wrote to memory before calling F. As a workaround, the complex expressions that are being passed as kwargs to the builtin should be cached in memory prior to the call to the builtin.
The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vyper | Vyperlang | * | 0.3.10 (excluding) |
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language’s interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application’s memory:
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program’s executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as “rebasing” (for Windows) and “prelinking” (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].