Garden provides automation for Kubernetes development and testing. Prior tov ersions 0.13.17 and 0.12.65, Garden has a dependency on the cryo library, which is vulnerable to code injection due to an insecure implementation of deserialization. Garden stores serialized objects using cryo in the Kubernetes ConfigMap
resources prefixed with test-result
and run-result
to cache Garden test and run results. These ConfigMaps
are stored either in the garden-system
namespace or the configured user namespace. When a user invokes the command garden test
or garden run
objects stored in the ConfigMap
are retrieved and deserialized. This can be used by an attacker with access to the Kubernetes cluster to store malicious objects in the ConfigMap
, which can trigger a remote code execution on the users machine when cryo deserializes the object. In order to exploit this vulnerability, an attacker must have access to the Kubernetes cluster used to deploy garden remote environments. Further, a user must actively invoke either a garden test
or garden run
which has previously cached results. The issue has been patched in Garden versions 0.13.17
(Bonsai) and 0.12.65
(Acorn). Only Garden versions prior to these are vulnerable. No known workarounds are available.
The product constructs all or part of a code segment using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the syntax or behavior of the intended code segment.
Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
---|---|---|---|
Garden | Garden | * | 0.12.65 (excluding) |
Garden | Garden | 0.13.0 (including) | 0.13.17 (excluding) |
When a product allows a user’s input to contain code syntax, it might be possible for an attacker to craft the code in such a way that it will alter the intended control flow of the product. Such an alteration could lead to arbitrary code execution. Injection problems encompass a wide variety of issues – all mitigated in very different ways. For this reason, the most effective way to discuss these weaknesses is to note the distinct features which classify them as injection weaknesses. The most important issue to note is that all injection problems share one thing in common – i.e., they allow for the injection of control plane data into the user-controlled data plane. This means that the execution of the process may be altered by sending code in through legitimate data channels, using no other mechanism. While buffer overflows, and many other flaws, involve the use of some further issue to gain execution, injection problems need only for the data to be parsed. The most classic instantiations of this category of weakness are SQL injection and format string vulnerabilities.