Artifact Hub is a web-based application that enables finding, installing, and publishing packages and configurations for CNCF projects. During a security audit of Artifact Hubs code base a security researcher identified a bug in which the registryIsDockerHub function was only checking that the registry domain had the docker.io suffix. Artifact Hub allows providing some Docker credentials that are used to increase the rate limit applied when interacting with the Docker Hub registry API to read publicly available content. Due to the incorrect check described above, itd be possible to hijack those credentials by purchasing a domain which ends with docker.io and deploying a fake OCI registry on it. https://artifacthub.io/ uses some credentials that only have permissions to read public content available in the Docker Hub. However, even though credentials for private repositories (disabled on artifacthub.io) are handled in a different way, other Artifact Hub deployments could have been using them for a different purpose. This issue has been resolved in version 1.16.0. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.
The product downloads source code or an executable from a remote location and executes the code without sufficiently verifying the origin and integrity of the code.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hub | Artifacthub | * | 1.16.0 (excluding) |
Encrypt the code with a reliable encryption scheme before transmitting.
This will only be a partial solution, since it will not detect DNS spoofing and it will not prevent your code from being modified on the hosting site.
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Speficially, it may be helpful to use tools or frameworks to perform integrity checking on the transmitted code.
Run the code in a “jail” or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.