Jellyfin is a Free Software Media System for managing and streaming media. In affected versions there is an argument injection in the VideosController, specifically the /Videos/<itemId>/stream
and /Videos/<itemId>/stream.<container>
endpoints which are present in the current Jellyfin version. Additional endpoints in the AudioController might also be vulnerable, as they differ only slightly in execution. Those endpoints are reachable by an unauthenticated user. In order to exploit this vulnerability an unauthenticated attacker has to guess an itemId, which is a completely random GUID. It’s a very unlikely case even for a large media database with lots of items. Without an additional information leak, this vulnerability shouldn’t be directly exploitable, even if the instance is reachable from the Internet. There are a lot of query parameters that get accepted by the method. At least two of those, videoCodec and audioCodec are vulnerable to the argument injection. The values can be traced through a lot of code and might be changed in the process. However, the fallback is to always use them as-is, which means we can inject our own arguments. Those arguments land in the command line of FFmpeg. Because UseShellExecute is always set to false, we can’t simply terminate the FFmpeg command and execute our own. It should only be possible to add additional arguments to FFmpeg, which is powerful enough as it stands. There is probably a way of overwriting an arbitrary file with malicious content. This vulnerability has been addressed in version 10.8.13. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.
The product constructs a string for a command to be executed by a separate component in another control sphere, but it does not properly delimit the intended arguments, options, or switches within that command string.
Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
---|---|---|---|
Jellyfin | Jellyfin | * | 10.8.13 (excluding) |
When creating commands using interpolation into a string, developers may assume that only the arguments/options that they specify will be processed. This assumption may be even stronger when the programmer has encoded the command in a way that prevents separate commands from being provided maliciously, e.g. in the case of shell metacharacters. When constructing the command, the developer may use whitespace or other delimiters that are required to separate arguments when the command. However, if an attacker can provide an untrusted input that contains argument-separating delimiters, then the resulting command will have more arguments than intended by the developer. The attacker may then be able to change the behavior of the command. Depending on the functionality supported by the extraneous arguments, this may have security-relevant consequences.