In QUIC in RFC 9000, the Latency Spin Bit specification (section 17.4) does not strictly constrain the bit value when the feature is disabled, which might allow remote attackers to construct a covert channel with data represented as changes to the bit value. NOTE: The Sheridan, S., Keane, A. (2015). In Proceedings of the 14th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security (ECCWS), University of Hertfordshire, Hatfield, UK. paper says Modern Internet communication protocols provide an almost infinite number of ways in which data can be hidden or embed whithin seemingly normal network traffic.
Weakness
The web application does not, or can not, sufficiently verify whether a well-formed, valid, consistent request was intentionally provided by the user who submitted the request.
Potential Mitigations
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330]
- Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
- Use the “double-submitted cookie” method as described by Felten and Zeller:
- When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user’s machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same.
- Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult.
- This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
References