CVE-2023-52589

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

media: rkisp1: Fix IRQ disable race issue

In rkisp1_isp_stop() and rkisp1_csi_disable() the driver masks the interrupts and then apparently assumes that the interrupt handler wont be running, and proceeds in the stop procedure. This is not the case, as the interrupt handler can already be running, which would lead to the ISP being disabled while the interrupt handler handling a captured frame.

This brings up two issues: 1) the ISP could be powered off while the interrupt handler is still running and accessing registers, leading to board lockup, and 2) the interrupt handler code and the code that disables the streaming might do things that conflict.

It is not clear to me if 2) causes a real issue, but 1) can be seen with a suitable delay (or printk in my case) in the interrupt handler, leading to board lockup.

Weakness

The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.

Affected Software

Extended Description

A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and it is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc. A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:

A race condition exists when an “interfering code sequence” can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. The interfering code sequence could be “trusted” or “untrusted.” A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the product; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable product.

Potential Mitigations

• Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring.
• Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).

Related Attack Patterns

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/26.html
• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/29.html

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7bb1a2822aa2c2de4e09bf7c56dd93bd532f1fa7
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/870565f063a58576e8a4529f122cac4325c6b395
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf808f58681cab64c81cd814551814fd34e540fe
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fab483438342984f2a315fe13c882a80f0f7e545
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7bb1a2822aa2c2de4e09bf7c56dd93bd532f1fa7
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/870565f063a58576e8a4529f122cac4325c6b395
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf808f58681cab64c81cd814551814fd34e540fe
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fab483438342984f2a315fe13c882a80f0f7e545