CVE-2023-52609

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

binder: fix race between mmput() and do_exit()

Task A calls binder_update_page_range() to allocate and insert pages on a remote address space from Task B. For this, Task A pins the remote mm via mmget_not_zero() first. This can race with Task B do_exit() and the final mmput() refcount decrement will come from Task A.

Task A | Task B ——————+—————— mmget_not_zero() | | do_exit() | exit_mm() | mmput() mmput() | exit_mmap() | remove_vma() | fput() |

In this case, the work of ____fput() from Task B is queued up in Task A as TWA_RESUME. So in theory, Task A returns to userspace and the cleanup work gets executed. However, Task A instead sleep, waiting for a reply from Task B that never comes (its dead).

This means the binder_deferred_release() is blocked until an unrelated binder event forces Task A to go back to userspace. All the associated death notifications will also be delayed until then.

In order to fix this use mmput_async() that will schedule the work in the corresponding mm->async_put_work WQ instead of Task A.

Weakness

The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.

Affected Software

Extended Description

A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and it is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc. A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:

A race condition exists when an “interfering code sequence” can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. The interfering code sequence could be “trusted” or “untrusted.” A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the product; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable product.

Potential Mitigations

• Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring.
• Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).

Related Attack Patterns

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/26.html
• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/29.html

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/252a2a5569eb9f8d16428872cc24dea1ac0bb097
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6696f76c32ff67fec26823fc2df46498e70d9bf3
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/67f16bf2cc1698fd50e01ee8a2becc5a8e6d3a3e
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/77d210e8db4d61d43b2d16df66b1ec46fad2ee01
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7e7a0d86542b0ea903006d3f42f33c4f7ead6918
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/95b1d336b0642198b56836b89908d07b9a0c9608
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/98fee5bee97ad47b527a997d5786410430d1f0e9
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a9ab0d963621d9d12199df9817e66982582d5a5
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/252a2a5569eb9f8d16428872cc24dea1ac0bb097
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6696f76c32ff67fec26823fc2df46498e70d9bf3
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/67f16bf2cc1698fd50e01ee8a2becc5a8e6d3a3e
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/77d210e8db4d61d43b2d16df66b1ec46fad2ee01
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7e7a0d86542b0ea903006d3f42f33c4f7ead6918
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/95b1d336b0642198b56836b89908d07b9a0c9608
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/98fee5bee97ad47b527a997d5786410430d1f0e9
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a9ab0d963621d9d12199df9817e66982582d5a5
• https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00016.html
• https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00020.html