CVE-2023-52740

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

powerpc/64s/interrupt: Fix interrupt exit race with security mitigation switch

The RFI and STF security mitigation options can flip the interrupt_exit_not_reentrant static branch condition concurrently with the interrupt exit code which tests that branch.

Interrupt exit tests this condition to set MSR[EE|RI] for exit, then again in the case a soft-masked interrupt is found pending, to recover the MSR so the interrupt can be replayed before attempting to exit again. If the condition changes between these two tests, the MSR and irq soft-mask state will become corrupted, leading to warnings and possible crashes. For example, if the branch is initially true then false, MSR[EE] will be 0 but PACA_IRQ_HARD_DIS clear and EE may not get enabled, leading to warnings in irq_64.c.

Weakness

The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.

Affected Software

Extended Description

A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and it is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc. A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:

A race condition exists when an “interfering code sequence” can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. The interfering code sequence could be “trusted” or “untrusted.” A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the product; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable product.

Potential Mitigations

• Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring.
• Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).

Related Attack Patterns

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/26.html
• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/29.html

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2ea31e2e62bbc4d11c411eeb36f1b02841dbcab1
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6f097c24815e67909a1fcc2c605586d02babd673
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/86f7e423933608d536015a0f2eb9e0338c1227e0
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2ea31e2e62bbc4d11c411eeb36f1b02841dbcab1
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6f097c24815e67909a1fcc2c605586d02babd673
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/86f7e423933608d536015a0f2eb9e0338c1227e0