CVE-2023-52872

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tty: n_gsm: fix race condition in status line change on dead connections

gsm_cleanup_mux() cleans up the gsm by closing all DLCIs, stopping all timers, removing the virtual tty devices and clearing the data queues. This procedure, however, may cause subsequent changes of the virtual modem status lines of a DLCI. More data is being added the outgoing data queue and the deleted kick timer is restarted to handle this. At this point many resources have already been removed by the cleanup procedure. Thus, a kernel panic occurs.

Fix this by proving in gsm_modem_update() that the cleanup procedure has not been started and the mux is still alive.

Note that writing to a virtual tty is already protected by checks against the DLCI specific connection state.

Weakness

The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.

Affected Software

Extended Description

A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and it is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc. A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:

A race condition exists when an “interfering code sequence” can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. The interfering code sequence could be “trusted” or “untrusted.” A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the product; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable product.

Potential Mitigations

• Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring.
• Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).

Related Attack Patterns

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/26.html
• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/29.html

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/19d34b73234af542cc8a218cf398dee73cdb1890
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3a75b205de43365f80a33b98ec9289785da56243
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/81a4dd5e6c78f5d8952fa8c9d36565db1fe01444
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce4df90333c4fe65acb8b5089fdfe9b955ce976a
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/df6cfab66ff2a44bd23ad5dd5309cb3421bb6593
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/19d34b73234af542cc8a218cf398dee73cdb1890
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3a75b205de43365f80a33b98ec9289785da56243
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/81a4dd5e6c78f5d8952fa8c9d36565db1fe01444
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce4df90333c4fe65acb8b5089fdfe9b955ce976a
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/df6cfab66ff2a44bd23ad5dd5309cb3421bb6593