CVE-2023-52886

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

USB: core: Fix race by not overwriting udev->descriptor in hub_port_init()

Syzbot reported an out-of-bounds read in sysfs.c:read_descriptors():

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_descriptors+0x263/0x280 drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c:883 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88801e78b8c8 by task udevd/5011

CPU: 0 PID: 5011 Comm: udevd Not tainted 6.4.0-rc6-syzkaller-00195-g40f71e7cd3c6 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/27/2023 Call Trace: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x150 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3c0 mm/kasan/report.c:351 print_report mm/kasan/report.c:462 [inline] kasan_report+0x11c/0x130 mm/kasan/report.c:572 read_descriptors+0x263/0x280 drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c:883 … Allocated by task 758: … __do_kmalloc_node mm/slab_common.c:966 [inline] __kmalloc+0x5e/0x190 mm/slab_common.c:979 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:563 [inline] kzalloc include/linux/slab.h:680 [inline] usb_get_configuration+0x1f7/0x5170 drivers/usb/core/config.c:887 usb_enumerate_device drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2407 [inline] usb_new_device+0x12b0/0x19d0 drivers/usb/core/hub.c:2545

As analyzed by Khazhy Kumykov, the cause of this bug is a race between read_descriptors() and hub_port_init(): The first routine uses a field in udev->descriptor, not expecting it to change, while the second overwrites it.

Prior to commit 45bf39f8df7f (USB: core: Dont hold device lock while reading the descriptors sysfs file) this race couldnt occur, because the routines were mutually exclusive thanks to the device locking. Removing that locking from read_descriptors() exposed it to the race.

The best way to fix the bug is to keep hub_port_init() from changing udev->descriptor once udev has been initialized and registered. Drivers expect the descriptors stored in the kernel to be immutable; we should not undermine this expectation. In fact, this change should have been made long ago.

So now hub_port_init() will take an additional argument, specifying a buffer in which to store the device descriptor it reads. (If udev has not yet been initialized, the buffer pointer will be NULL and then hub_port_init() will store the device descriptor in udev as before.) This eliminates the data race responsible for the out-of-bounds read.

The changes to hub_port_init() appear more extensive than they really are, because of indentation changes resulting from an attempt to avoid writing to other parts of the usb_device structure after it has been initialized. Similar changes should be made to the code that reads the BOS descriptor, but that can be handled in a separate patch later on. This patch is sufficient to fix the bug found by syzbot.

Weakness

The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.

Affected Software

Potential Mitigations

• Assume all input is malicious. Use an “accept known good” input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
• When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, “boat” may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as “red” or “blue.”
• Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code’s environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
• To reduce the likelihood of introducing an out-of-bounds read, ensure that you validate and ensure correct calculations for any length argument, buffer size calculation, or offset. Be especially careful of relying on a sentinel (i.e. special character such as NUL) in untrusted inputs.

Related Attack Patterns

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/540.html

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7fe9d87996062f5eb0ca476ad0257f79bf43aaf5
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8186596a663506b1124bede9fde6f243ef9f37ee
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9d241c5d9a9b7ad95c90c6520272fe404d5ac88f
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4a074b1fb222164ed7d5c0b8c922dc4a0840848
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b9fbfb349eacc0820f91c797d7f0a3ac7a4935b5
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff33299ec8bb80cdcc073ad9c506bd79bb2ed20b
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7fe9d87996062f5eb0ca476ad0257f79bf43aaf5
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8186596a663506b1124bede9fde6f243ef9f37ee
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9d241c5d9a9b7ad95c90c6520272fe404d5ac88f
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4a074b1fb222164ed7d5c0b8c922dc4a0840848
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b9fbfb349eacc0820f91c797d7f0a3ac7a4935b5
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff33299ec8bb80cdcc073ad9c506bd79bb2ed20b