It is possible for a user in a different organization from the owner of a snapshot to bypass authorization and delete a snapshot by issuing a DELETE request to /api/snapshots/ using its view key. This functionality is intended to only be available to individuals with the permission to write/edit to the snapshot in question, but due to a bug in the authorization logic, deletion requests issued by an unprivileged user in a different organization than the snapshot owner are treated as authorized.
Grafana Labs would like to thank Ravid Mazon and Jay Chen of Palo Alto Research for discovering and disclosing this vulnerability.
This issue affects Grafana: from 9.5.0 before 9.5.18, from 10.0.0 before 10.0.13, from 10.1.0 before 10.1.9, from 10.2.0 before 10.2.6, from 10.3.0 before 10.3.5.
The system’s authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user’s data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 | RedHat | grafana-0:9.2.10-16.el8_10 | * |
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 | RedHat | grafana-0:9.2.10-16.el9_4 | * |
Retrieval of a user record occurs in the system based on some key value that is under user control. The key would typically identify a user-related record stored in the system and would be used to lookup that record for presentation to the user. It is likely that an attacker would have to be an authenticated user in the system. However, the authorization process would not properly check the data access operation to ensure that the authenticated user performing the operation has sufficient entitlements to perform the requested data access, hence bypassing any other authorization checks present in the system. For example, attackers can look at places where user specific data is retrieved (e.g. search screens) and determine whether the key for the item being looked up is controllable externally. The key may be a hidden field in the HTML form field, might be passed as a URL parameter or as an unencrypted cookie variable, then in each of these cases it will be possible to tamper with the key value. One manifestation of this weakness is when a system uses sequential or otherwise easily-guessable session IDs that would allow one user to easily switch to another user’s session and read/modify their data.