CVE Vulnerabilities

CVE-2024-20513

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

Published: Oct 02, 2024 | Modified: Oct 08, 2024
CVSS 3.x
5.3
MEDIUM
Source:
NVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
CVSS 2.x
RedHat/V2
RedHat/V3
Ubuntu

A vulnerability in the Cisco AnyConnect VPN server of Cisco Meraki MX and Cisco Meraki Z Series Teleworker Gateway devices could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause a DoS condition for targeted users of the AnyConnect service on an affected device.

This vulnerability is due to insufficient entropy for handlers that are used during SSL VPN session establishment. An unauthenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability by brute forcing valid session handlers. An authenticated attacker could exploit this vulnerability by connecting to the AnyConnect VPN service of an affected device to retrieve a valid session handler and, based on that handler, predict further valid session handlers. The attacker would then send a crafted HTTPS request using the brute-forced or predicted session handler to the AnyConnect VPN server of the device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to terminate targeted SSL VPN sessions, forcing remote users to initiate new VPN connections and reauthenticate.

Weakness

The system’s authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user’s data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.

Affected Software

Name Vendor Start Version End Version
Meraki_mx65_firmware Cisco 17.6.0 (including) 18.211.2 (excluding)

Extended Description

Retrieval of a user record occurs in the system based on some key value that is under user control. The key would typically identify a user-related record stored in the system and would be used to lookup that record for presentation to the user. It is likely that an attacker would have to be an authenticated user in the system. However, the authorization process would not properly check the data access operation to ensure that the authenticated user performing the operation has sufficient entitlements to perform the requested data access, hence bypassing any other authorization checks present in the system. For example, attackers can look at places where user specific data is retrieved (e.g. search screens) and determine whether the key for the item being looked up is controllable externally. The key may be a hidden field in the HTML form field, might be passed as a URL parameter or as an unencrypted cookie variable, then in each of these cases it will be possible to tamper with the key value. One manifestation of this weakness is when a system uses sequential or otherwise easily-guessable session IDs that would allow one user to easily switch to another user’s session and read/modify their data.

Potential Mitigations

References