Buffer overflow in identifier field of WSD probe request process of Small Office Multifunction Printers and Laser Printers() which may allow an attacker on the network segment to trigger the affected product being unresponsive or to execute arbitrary code.:Satera MF740C Series/Satera MF640C Series/Satera LBP660C Series/Satera LBP620C Series firmware v12.07 and earlier, and Satera MF750C Series/Satera LBP670C Series firmware v03.09 and earlier sold in Japan.Color imageCLASS MF740C Series/Color imageCLASS MF640C Series/Color imageCLASS X MF1127C/Color imageCLASS LBP664Cdw/Color imageCLASS LBP622Cdw/Color imageCLASS X LBP1127C firmware v12.07 and earlier, and Color imageCLASS MF750C Series/Color imageCLASS X MF1333C/Color imageCLASS LBP674Cdw/Color imageCLASS X LBP1333C firmware v03.09 and earlier sold in US.i-SENSYS MF740C Series/i-SENSYS MF640C Series/C1127i Series/i-SENSYS LBP660C Series/i-SENSYS LBP620C Series/C1127P firmware v12.07 and earlier, and i-SENSYS MF750C Series/C1333i Series/i-SENSYS LBP673Cdw/C1333P firmware v03.09 and earlier sold in Europe.
The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.
Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.
Be wary that a language’s interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.
Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.
D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.
Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application’s memory:
Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program’s executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as “rebasing” (for Windows) and “prelinking” (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].