ThinkSystem SR670V2 servers manufactured from approximately June 2021 to July 2023 were left in Manufacturing Mode which could allow
an attacker with privileged logical access to the host or physical access to server internals to modify or disable Intel Boot Guard firmware integrity, SPS security, and other SPS configuration setting. The server’s NIST SP 800-193-compliant Platform Firmware Resiliency (PFR) security subsystem significantly mitigates this issue.
The product released to market is released in pre-production or manufacturing configuration.
Products in the pre-production or manufacturing stages are configured to have many debug hooks and debug capabilities, including but not limited to:
The above is by no means an exhaustive list, but it alludes to the greater capability and the greater state of vulnerability of a product during it’s preproduction or manufacturing state. Complexity increases when multiple parties are involved in executing the tests before the final production version. For example, a chipmaker might fabricate a chip and run its own preproduction tests, following which the chip would be delivered to the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), who would now run a second set of different preproduction tests on the same chip. Only after both of these sets of activities are complete, can the overall manufacturing phase be called “complete” and have the “Manufacturing Complete” fuse blown. However, if the OEM forgets to blow the Manufacturing Complete fuse, then the system remains in the manufacturing stage, rendering the system both exposed and vulnerable.