mod_auth_openidc is an OpenID Certified™ authentication and authorization module for the Apache 2.x HTTP server that implements the OpenID Connect Relying Party functionality. In affected versions missing input validation on mod_auth_openidc_session_chunks cookie value makes the server vulnerable to a denial of service (DoS) attack. An internal security audit has been conducted and the reviewers found that if they manipulated the value of the mod_auth_openidc_session_chunks cookie to a very large integer, like 99999999, the server struggles with the request for a long time and finally gets back with a 500 error. Making a few requests of this kind caused our server to become unresponsive. Attackers can craft requests that would make the server work very hard (and possibly become unresponsive) and/or crash with minimal effort. This issue has been addressed in version 2.4.15.2. Users are advised to upgrade. There are no known workarounds for this vulnerability.
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource, thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources.
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the product, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system. There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute – and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.