In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/sched: flower: Fix chain template offload

When a qdisc is deleted from a net device the stack instructs the underlying driver to remove its flow offload callback from the associated filter block using the FLOW_BLOCK_UNBIND command. The stack then continues to replay the removal of the filters in the block for this driver by iterating over the chains in the block and invoking the reoffload operation of the classifier being used. In turn, the classifier in its reoffload operation prepares and emits a FLOW_CLS_DESTROY command for each filter.

However, the stack does not do the same for chain templates and the underlying driver never receives a FLOW_CLS_TMPLT_DESTROY command when a qdisc is deleted. This results in a memory leak [1] which can be reproduced using [2].

Fix by introducing a tmplt_reoffload operation and have the stack invoke it with the appropriate arguments as part of the replay. Implement the operation in the sole classifier that supports chain templates (flower) by emitting the FLOW_CLS_TMPLT_{CREATE,DESTROY} command based on whether a flow offload callback is being bound to a filter block or being unbound from one.

As far as I can tell, the issue happens since cited commit which reordered tcf_block_offload_unbind() before tcf_block_flush_all_chains() in __tcf_block_put(). The order cannot be reversed as the filter block is expected to be freed after flushing all the chains.

[1] unreferenced object 0xffff888107e28800 (size 2048): comm tc, pid 1079, jiffies 4294958525 (age 3074.287s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): b1 a6 7c 11 81 88 ff ff e0 5b b3 10 81 88 ff ff ..|……[…… 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 e0 aa b0 84 ff ff ff ff ……………. backtrace: [] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1e8/0x320 [] __kmalloc+0x4e/0x90 [] mlxsw_sp_acl_ruleset_get+0x34d/0x7a0 [] mlxsw_sp_flower_tmplt_create+0x145/0x180 [] mlxsw_sp_flow_block_cb+0x1ea/0x280 [] tc_setup_cb_call+0x183/0x340 [] fl_tmplt_create+0x3da/0x4c0 [] tc_ctl_chain+0xa15/0x1170 [] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3cc/0xed0 [] netlink_rcv_skb+0x170/0x440 [] netlink_unicast+0x540/0x820 [] netlink_sendmsg+0x8d8/0xda0 [] ____sys_sendmsg+0x30f/0xa80 [] ___sys_sendmsg+0x13a/0x1e0 [] __sys_sendmsg+0x11c/0x1f0 [] do_syscall_64+0x40/0xe0 unreferenced object 0xffff88816d2c0400 (size 1024): comm tc, pid 1079, jiffies 4294958525 (age 3074.287s) hex dump (first 32 bytes): 40 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 57 f6 38 be 00 00 00 00 @…….W.8….. 10 04 2c 6d 81 88 ff ff 10 04 2c 6d 81 88 ff ff ..,m……,m…. backtrace: [] __kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x1e8/0x320 [] __kmalloc_node+0x51/0x90 [] kvmalloc_node+0xa6/0x1f0 [] bucket_table_alloc.isra.0+0x83/0x460 [] rhashtable_init+0x43b/0x7c0 [] mlxsw_sp_acl_ruleset_get+0x428/0x7a0 [] mlxsw_sp_flower_tmplt_create+0x145/0x180 [] mlxsw_sp_flow_block_cb+0x1ea/0x280 [] tc_setup_cb_call+0x183/0x340 [] fl_tmplt_create+0x3da/0x4c0 [] tc_ctl_chain+0xa15/0x1170 [] rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x3cc/0xed0 [] netlink_rcv_skb+0x170/0x440 [] netlink_unicast+0x540/0x820 [] netlink_sendmsg+0x8d8/0xda0 [] ____sys_sendmsg+0x30f/0xa80

[2]

tc qdisc add dev swp1 clsact

tc chain add dev swp1 ingress proto ip chain 1 flower dst_ip 0.0.0.0/32

tc qdisc del dev

—truncated—

Weakness

The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.

Affected Software

Potential Mitigations

• Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

• For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.

• Be wary that a language’s interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.

• Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

• Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.

• Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

• D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

• Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application’s memory:

• Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program’s executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

• Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as “rebasing” (for Windows) and “prelinking” (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

• For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

• Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

• For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/32f2a0afa95fae0d1ceec2ff06e0e816939964b8
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9ed46144cff3598a5cf79955630e795ff9af5b97
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c04709b2cc99ae31c346f79f0211752d7b74df01
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/32f2a0afa95fae0d1ceec2ff06e0e816939964b8
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9ed46144cff3598a5cf79955630e795ff9af5b97
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c04709b2cc99ae31c346f79f0211752d7b74df01