CVE-2024-26671

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

blk-mq: fix IO hang from sbitmap wakeup race

In blk_mq_mark_tag_wait(), __add_wait_queue() may be re-ordered with the following blk_mq_get_driver_tag() in case of getting driver tag failure.

Then in __sbitmap_queue_wake_up(), waitqueue_active() may not observe the added waiter in blk_mq_mark_tag_wait() and wake up nothing, meantime blk_mq_mark_tag_wait() cant get driver tag successfully.

This issue can be reproduced by running the following test in loop, and fio hang can be observed in < 30min when running it on my test VM in laptop.

modprobe -r scsi_debug
modprobe scsi_debug delay=0 dev_size_mb=4096 max_queue=1 host_max_queue=1 submit_queues=4
dev=`ls -d /sys/bus/pseudo/drivers/scsi_debug/adapter*/host*/target*/*/block/* | head -1 | xargs basename`
fio --filename=/dev/$dev --direct=1 --rw=randrw --bs=4k --iodepth=1 
   		--runtime=100 --numjobs=40 --time_based --name=test 
    	--ioengine=libaio

Fix the issue by adding one explicit barrier in blk_mq_mark_tag_wait(), which is just fine in case of running out of tag.

Weakness

The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.

Affected Software

Extended Description

A race condition occurs within concurrent environments, and it is effectively a property of a code sequence. Depending on the context, a code sequence may be in the form of a function call, a small number of instructions, a series of program invocations, etc. A race condition violates these properties, which are closely related:

A race condition exists when an “interfering code sequence” can still access the shared resource, violating exclusivity. The interfering code sequence could be “trusted” or “untrusted.” A trusted interfering code sequence occurs within the product; it cannot be modified by the attacker, and it can only be invoked indirectly. An untrusted interfering code sequence can be authored directly by the attacker, and typically it is external to the vulnerable product.

Potential Mitigations

• Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring.
• Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).

Related Attack Patterns

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/26.html
• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/29.html

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d9c777d3e70bdc57dddf7a14a80059d65919e56
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5266caaf5660529e3da53004b8b7174cab6374ed
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6d8b01624a2540336a32be91f25187a433af53a0
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7610ba1319253225a9ba8a9d28d472fc883b4e2f
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89e0e66682e1538aeeaa3109503473663cd24c8b
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9525b38180e2753f0daa1a522b7767a2aa969676
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ecd7744a1446eb02ccc63e493e2eb6ede4ef1e10
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f1bc0d8163f8ee84a8d5affdf624cfad657df1d2
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d9c777d3e70bdc57dddf7a14a80059d65919e56
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5266caaf5660529e3da53004b8b7174cab6374ed
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6d8b01624a2540336a32be91f25187a433af53a0
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7610ba1319253225a9ba8a9d28d472fc883b4e2f
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89e0e66682e1538aeeaa3109503473663cd24c8b
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9525b38180e2753f0daa1a522b7767a2aa969676
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ecd7744a1446eb02ccc63e493e2eb6ede4ef1e10
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f1bc0d8163f8ee84a8d5affdf624cfad657df1d2
• https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00017.html
• https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00020.html