jose is JavaScript module for JSON Object Signing and Encryption, providing support for JSON Web Tokens (JWT), JSON Web Signature (JWS), JSON Web Encryption (JWE), JSON Web Key (JWK), JSON Web Key Set (JWKS), and more. A vulnerability has been identified in the JSON Web Encryption (JWE) decryption interfaces, specifically related to the support for decompressing plaintext after its decryption. Under certain conditions it is possible to have the users environment consume unreasonable amount of CPU time or memory during JWE Decryption operations. This issue has been patched in versions 2.0.7 and 4.15.5.
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.
| Name | Vendor | Start Version | End Version |
|---|---|---|---|
| Multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8 | RedHat | multicluster-engine/console-mce-rhel8:v2.4.5-25 | * |
| Multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.4 for RHEL 8 | RedHat | multicluster-engine/multicluster-engine-console-mce-rhel8:v2.4.5-25 | * |
| Multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.5 for RHEL 9 | RedHat | multicluster-engine/console-mce-rhel9:v2.5.2-6 | * |
| Multicluster engine for Kubernetes 2.5 for RHEL 9 | RedHat | multicluster-engine/multicluster-engine-console-mce-rhel9:v2.5.2-6 | * |
| Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes 2.10 for RHEL 9 | RedHat | rhacm2/console-rhel9:v2.10.1-3 | * |
| Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes 2.9 for RHEL 8 | RedHat | rhacm2/console-rhel8:v2.9.4-22 | * |
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 | RedHat | container-tools:rhel8-8100020240610105040.afee755d | * |
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 | RedHat | jose-0:10-2.el8_10.3 | * |
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 | RedHat | podman-4:4.9.4-4.el9_4 | * |
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 | RedHat | buildah-2:1.33.7-2.el9_4 | * |
| Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9 | RedHat | jose-0:14-1.el9 | * |
| Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.16 | RedHat | podman-4:4.9.4-5.1.rhaos4.16.el8 | * |
| Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.16 | RedHat | skopeo-2:1.14.4-1.rhaos4.16.el9 | * |
| Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.16 | RedHat | openshift4/ose-docker-builder-rhel9:v4.16.0-202406131906.p0.gca2b36a.assembly.stream.el9 | * |
| Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.16 | RedHat | openshift4/ose-openshift-controller-manager-rhel9:v4.16.0-202406131906.p0.g1432fe0.assembly.stream.el9 | * |
| Red Hat OpenShift Service Mesh 2.6 for RHEL 8 | RedHat | openshift-service-mesh/grafana-rhel8:2.6.0-7 | * |
| Red Hat OpenShift Service Mesh 2.6 for RHEL 8 | RedHat | openshift-service-mesh/istio-cni-rhel8:2.6.0-21 | * |
| Red Hat OpenShift Service Mesh 2.6 for RHEL 8 | RedHat | openshift-service-mesh/istio-must-gather-rhel8:2.6.0-7 | * |
| Red Hat OpenShift Service Mesh 2.6 for RHEL 8 | RedHat | openshift-service-mesh/istio-rhel8-operator:2.6.0-27 | * |
| Red Hat OpenShift Service Mesh 2.6 for RHEL 8 | RedHat | openshift-service-mesh/kiali-ossmc-rhel8:1.73.10-3 | * |
| Red Hat OpenShift Service Mesh 2.6 for RHEL 8 | RedHat | openshift-service-mesh/kiali-rhel8:1.73.9-2 | * |
| Red Hat OpenShift Service Mesh 2.6 for RHEL 8 | RedHat | openshift-service-mesh/kiali-rhel8-operator:1.73.10-2 | * |
| Red Hat OpenShift Service Mesh 2.6 for RHEL 8 | RedHat | openshift-service-mesh/pilot-rhel8:2.6.0-19 | * |
| Red Hat OpenShift Service Mesh 2.6 for RHEL 8 | RedHat | openshift-service-mesh/ratelimit-rhel8:2.6.0-8 | * |
| Red Hat OpenShift Service Mesh 2.6 for RHEL 9 | RedHat | openshift-service-mesh/proxyv2-rhel9:2.6.0-18 | * |
| RHODF-4.16-RHEL-9 | RedHat | odf4/cephcsi-rhel9:v4.16.0-33 | * |
| RHODF-4.16-RHEL-9 | RedHat | odf4/odf-multicluster-rhel9-operator:v4.16.2-2 | * |
| RHODF-4.17-RHEL-9 | RedHat | odf4/odf-multicluster-rhel9-operator:v4.17.0-17 | * |
| Node-jose | Ubuntu | mantic | * |
| Node-jose | Ubuntu | oracular | * |
Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute – and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.