gotortc is a camera streaming application. Versions 1.8.5 and prior are vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery. The /api/config endpoint allows one to modify the existing configuration with user-supplied values. While the API is only allowing localhost to interact without authentication, an attacker may be able to achieve that depending on how go2rtc is set up on the upstream application, and given that this endpoint is not protected against CSRF, it allows requests from any origin (e.g. a drive-by attack) . The exec handler allows for any stream to execute arbitrary commands. An attacker may add a custom stream through api/config, which may lead to arbitrary command execution. In the event of a victim visiting the server in question, their browser will execute the requests against the go2rtc instance. Commit 8793c3636493c5efdda08f3b5ed5c6e1ea594fd9 adds a warning about secure API access.
Weakness
The web application does not, or can not, sufficiently verify whether a well-formed, valid, consistent request was intentionally provided by the user who submitted the request.
Potential Mitigations
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, use anti-CSRF packages such as the OWASP CSRFGuard. [REF-330]
- Another example is the ESAPI Session Management control, which includes a component for CSRF. [REF-45]
- Use the “double-submitted cookie” method as described by Felten and Zeller:
- When a user visits a site, the site should generate a pseudorandom value and set it as a cookie on the user’s machine. The site should require every form submission to include this value as a form value and also as a cookie value. When a POST request is sent to the site, the request should only be considered valid if the form value and the cookie value are the same.
- Because of the same-origin policy, an attacker cannot read or modify the value stored in the cookie. To successfully submit a form on behalf of the user, the attacker would have to correctly guess the pseudorandom value. If the pseudorandom value is cryptographically strong, this will be prohibitively difficult.
- This technique requires Javascript, so it may not work for browsers that have Javascript disabled. [REF-331]
References