CVE-2024-2961

The iconv() function in the GNU C Library versions 2.39 and older may overflow the output buffer passed to it by up to 4 bytes when converting strings to the ISO-2022-CN-EXT character set, which may be used to crash an application or overwrite a neighbouring variable.

Weakness

The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.

Affected Software

Potential Mitigations

• Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

• For example, many languages that perform their own memory management, such as Java and Perl, are not subject to buffer overflows. Other languages, such as Ada and C#, typically provide overflow protection, but the protection can be disabled by the programmer.

• Be wary that a language’s interface to native code may still be subject to overflows, even if the language itself is theoretically safe.

• Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

• Examples include the Safe C String Library (SafeStr) by Messier and Viega [REF-57], and the Strsafe.h library from Microsoft [REF-56]. These libraries provide safer versions of overflow-prone string-handling functions.

• Use automatic buffer overflow detection mechanisms that are offered by certain compilers or compiler extensions. Examples include: the Microsoft Visual Studio /GS flag, Fedora/Red Hat FORTIFY_SOURCE GCC flag, StackGuard, and ProPolice, which provide various mechanisms including canary-based detection and range/index checking.

• D3-SFCV (Stack Frame Canary Validation) from D3FEND [REF-1334] discusses canary-based detection in detail.

• Consider adhering to the following rules when allocating and managing an application’s memory:

• Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program’s executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.

• Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as “rebasing” (for Windows) and “prelinking” (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.

• For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].

• Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.

• For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].

References

• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/04/17/9
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/04/18/4
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/04/24/2
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/05/27/1
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/05/27/2
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/05/27/3
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/05/27/4
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/05/27/5
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/05/27/6
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/07/22/5
• https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/05/msg00001.html
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/BTJFBGHDYG5PEIFD5WSSSKSFZ2AZWC5N/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/P3I4KYS6EU6S7QZ47WFNTPVAHFIUQNEL/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/YAMJQI3Y6BHWV3CUTYBXOZONCUJNOB2Z/
• https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20240531-0002/
• https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=blob;f=advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0004
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/04/17/9
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/04/18/4
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/04/24/2
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/05/27/1
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/05/27/2
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/05/27/3
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/05/27/4
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/05/27/5
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/05/27/6
• http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/07/22/5
• https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/05/msg00001.html
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/BTJFBGHDYG5PEIFD5WSSSKSFZ2AZWC5N/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/P3I4KYS6EU6S7QZ47WFNTPVAHFIUQNEL/
• https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/YAMJQI3Y6BHWV3CUTYBXOZONCUJNOB2Z/
• https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20240531-0002/
• https://sourceware.org/git/?p=glibc.git;a=blob;f=advisories/GLIBC-SA-2024-0004
• https://www.ambionics.io/blog/iconv-cve-2024-2961-p1
• https://www.ambionics.io/blog/iconv-cve-2024-2961-p2
• https://www.ambionics.io/blog/iconv-cve-2024-2961-p3