Sentry is an error tracking and performance monitoring platform. Prior to 24.4.1, when authenticating as a superuser to Sentry with a username and password, the password is leaked as cleartext in logs under the event: auth-index.validate_superuser. An attacker with access to the log data could use these leaked credentials to login to the Sentry system as superuser. Self-hosted users on affected versions should upgrade to 24.4.1 or later. Users can configure the logging level to exclude logs of the INFO level and only generate logs for levels at WARNING or more.
Weakness
The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes output that is written to logs.
Extended Description
This can allow an attacker to forge log entries or inject malicious content into logs.
Log forging vulnerabilities occur when:
Potential Mitigations
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an “accept known good” input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, “boat” may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as “red” or “blue.”
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code’s environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
References