CVE-2024-38552

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/amd/display: Fix potential index out of bounds in color transformation function

Fixes index out of bounds issue in the color transformation function. The issue could occur when the index i exceeds the number of transfer function points (TRANSFER_FUNC_POINTS).

The fix adds a check to ensure i is within bounds before accessing the transfer function points. If i is out of bounds, an error message is logged and the function returns false to indicate an error.

Reported by smatch: drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dcn10/dcn10_cm_common.c:405 cm_helper_translate_curve_to_hw_format() error: buffer overflow output_tf->tf_pts.red 1025 <= s32max drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dcn10/dcn10_cm_common.c:406 cm_helper_translate_curve_to_hw_format() error: buffer overflow output_tf->tf_pts.green 1025 <= s32max drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/../display/dc/dcn10/dcn10_cm_common.c:407 cm_helper_translate_curve_to_hw_format() error: buffer overflow output_tf->tf_pts.blue 1025 <= s32max

Weakness

The product uses untrusted input when calculating or using an array index, but the product does not validate or incorrectly validates the index to ensure the index references a valid position within the array.

Affected Software

Potential Mitigations

• For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
• Even though client-side checks provide minimal benefits with respect to server-side security, they are still useful. First, they can support intrusion detection. If the server receives input that should have been rejected by the client, then it may be an indication of an attack. Second, client-side error-checking can provide helpful feedback to the user about the expectations for valid input. Third, there may be a reduction in server-side processing time for accidental input errors, although this is typically a small savings.
• Use a language that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
• For example, Ada allows the programmer to constrain the values of a variable and languages such as Java and Ruby will allow the programmer to handle exceptions when an out-of-bounds index is accessed.
• Run or compile the software using features or extensions that randomly arrange the positions of a program’s executable and libraries in memory. Because this makes the addresses unpredictable, it can prevent an attacker from reliably jumping to exploitable code.
• Examples include Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [REF-58] [REF-60] and Position-Independent Executables (PIE) [REF-64]. Imported modules may be similarly realigned if their default memory addresses conflict with other modules, in a process known as “rebasing” (for Windows) and “prelinking” (for Linux) [REF-1332] using randomly generated addresses. ASLR for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink since it would require relocating the libraries at run-time, defeating the whole purpose of prelinking.
• For more information on these techniques see D3-SAOR (Segment Address Offset Randomization) from D3FEND [REF-1335].
• Use a CPU and operating system that offers Data Execution Protection (using hardware NX or XD bits) or the equivalent techniques that simulate this feature in software, such as PaX [REF-60] [REF-61]. These techniques ensure that any instruction executed is exclusively at a memory address that is part of the code segment.
• For more information on these techniques see D3-PSEP (Process Segment Execution Prevention) from D3FEND [REF-1336].
• Assume all input is malicious. Use an “accept known good” input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
• When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, “boat” may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as “red” or “blue.”
• Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code’s environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
• When accessing a user-controlled array index, use a stringent range of values that are within the target array. Make sure that you do not allow negative values to be used. That is, verify the minimum as well as the maximum of the range of acceptable values.
• Run the code in a “jail” or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
• OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
• This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
• Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

Related Attack Patterns

• https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/100.html

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/04bc4d1090c343025d69149ca669a27c5b9c34a7
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/123edbae64f4d21984359b99c6e79fcde31c6123
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e8c8b37ee84b3b19c448d2b8e4c916d2f5b9c86
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/604c506ca43fce52bb882cff9c1fdf2ec3b4029c
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/63ae548f1054a0b71678d0349c7dc9628ddd42ca
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7226ddf3311c5e5a7726ad7d4e7b079bb3cfbb29
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/98b8a6bfd30d07a19cfacdf82b50f84bf3360869
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ced9c4e2289a786b8fa684d8893b7045ea53ef7e
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e280ab978c81443103d7c61bdd1d8d708cf6ed6d